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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH.

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent

Vs.

)
)
)

Case No.

)
)

FRANK DAVID CLAUSON,

)

Defendant and Appellant.

* *

)
)

**********

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~mNT

OF THE CASE.

Frank David Clauson was on the 19th day of September, 1955, in Wasatch County, Utah, charged with the
crime of sodomy as follows:

in that the said Frank

David Clauson on or about the 14th day of September,

1955, in Wasatch County, State of Utah, did commit
the crime of sodomy upon the person of Mavis North

(R-2).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The defendant was bound over for trial upon a
waiver of preliminary hearing (R-1) and defendant
appeared for arraignment on September

23, 1955 (R-1)

and was returned to the Justice's Court in and for
Heber Precinct, Wasatch County, State of Utah, for
preliminary hearing by request of Glen s. Hatch,
attorney for defendant (R-1).
was had September 27,

Preliminary hearing

1955, and the defendant was

bound over to the District Court for trial by Archie

D. Buys, Justice of the Peace (R-1-2) (R-4)o
defendant appeared for arraignment October 11,
and on October 11,
Bill of Particulars
cember 10,

1955,

The

1955,

1955 the defendant demanded a
(R-7), which was furnished De-

(R~9).

Upon the defendant's plea

of not guilty entered October 11,

1955, before the

Honorable Joseph E. Nelson, one of the judges of the
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and
for Wasatch County, the case came on for hearing before a jury on the 50th day of November, 1955·

Then

proceeded to trial after both the defendant and the
State had
exhausted their preemptory challenges, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the defense rested.

The jury retired at 2;35 o 1 clock

P.M. on December 1, 1955 (Tr-155).

Defendant excepted

to court's refusal to give all the requested instructions Numbers 1 to 6 inclusive (Tr-154).

The Court

gave its instructions covering the offense, together
with stock instructions (Tr-135-Tr-15)).

Arguments

were presented.

The jury retired and returned a ver-

dict of guilty.

Defendant was sentenced by the Court

for an indeterminate period, not to exceed twenty
years in the Utah State Prison.

Within the time pro-

vided by law the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utaho

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1955,

On the 14th day of September,

the defend-

ant, Frank David Clauson, -at the request of Mavis

North, took her from Park City, Utah, to Heber-City,
Utah, in his automobile.
Clauson, and

~he

The defendant, Frank David

complaining witness, Mavis North,

met on the 14th day of September,

1955,

in a beer

tavern in Park City, Summit County, Utah 1 known as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at the request of the complaining witness, the defendant agreed to drive her to Heber City in his automobile.

After leaving the Drift, the complaining wit-

ness went to the Utah State Liquor Store and purchased
a fifth of wine for them to drink on the way to Heber
City (Tr-11).

The State contends that on the way to

Heber City, near the town of Keetley, the defendant
pulled off of the main highway and drove some distance
up a side road and that the defendant through force and
fear induced the complaining witness to commit the
act of sodomy (Tr-14, line 12-Tr-22A, line

5),

and

that during the time of the alleged act of the defendant an automobile drove up in the close

(Tr-22A, line 12).

vicinity

It was still light (Tr-58, line 9)

(Tr-?9, line 27 to 29).

The complaining witness

testified that she told Mr. Clauson that she

wou~d

give it to him if he would take it in a decent way

(Tr-J4,

lines_7 and

8),

but the prosecutrix had been

charged with adultery in Wasatch County, State of
Utah, prior to September 14,
Tr-~).

1955 (Tr-1)-14-15

and
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The Prosecutrix and the plaintiff were

friendly immediately after the alleged criminal acts
in that prosecutrix purchased some beer for defendant at Keatley on the way back to Heber and that she
told defendant that if he wanted intercourse he could
have it, but he would have to take it the right way
{Tr-41, line 17-18-19); that she was not frightened of
him when the automobile was parked near them (Tr-51,
lines 20 to

30). After reaching Heber both of them

drove to the hospital and visited the prosecutrix's husband {Tr-59, line 29).

Immediately following, defend-

ant and prosecutrix drove back to a beer joint and prosecutrix bought defendant some more beer (Tr-61, lines
12-24).

After the prosecutrix purchased a bottle of

whiskey at the State Liquor Store at Heber, two days
after the alleged act took place, at approximately
1:)0 in the afternoon of that day, the prosecutrix

complained to the Sheriff of Wasatch County about the
alleged act of the defendant on the two days previous
{Tr-27).

All of the testimony of the prosecutrix

relative to turning off from the main Heber Highway,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the act which took place thereat, was denied by
the defendant (Tr-108, line

7, Tr-110, line 11). The

court allowed, over defendant's objection, hearsay
testimony of a conversation between the Sheriff of
Wasatch County, and the complaining witness as to the
alleged actions of the defendant and out of the presence of the defendant.

Before the jury retired the

court submitted to them three forms of verdict, substantially as follows:

(1)

We, the jury impaneled

in the above entitled cause, find the defendant
guilty of the crime of sodomy as charged in the information.

(2)

We, the jury impaneled in the above en-

titled cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime
of intent to commit sodomy charged in the informationo

(?)

We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled

cause, find the defendant not guilty.
Before the jury retired for deliveration, during the instruction to the jury upon the law relative
to the matter, the court refused to give the following instructions requested by the defendant:

"You

are instructed
that
the
defendant
cannot
be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for
digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum and
Libraryconvicted
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on the sole and uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

By this is meant that if the only proof of any

one fact essential to the crime is furnished by an accomplice, then you must find the defendant not guilty.n

STATEMENT OF POINTS.
1. THE COURT ERRED IN FURNISHING THE JURY WITH
FORMS OF VERDICT IN THE MATTER, FAILING AJ.\1D NEG-LECTING TO FURI~ISH VERDICTS FOR !1~ AND ALL INCLUDED OFFENSES, PARTICULARLY A VERDICT OF PROPER FORM TO ENABLE THE JURY TO FlliD THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPT
TO COMMIT SODOMY.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS: nyou ARE FURTHER INSTRUCTED THAT IF THE WITNESS, MAVIS NORTH, CONSENTED
TO THE ALLEGED ACT OF SODOMY, SHE WOULD THEN BE AN
ACCOMPLICE, A}ID UNLESS HER TESTIMONY AS TO ANY ESSENTIAL FACT WERE CORROBORATED, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DEFENDAl\IT NOT GUILTY."
"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THE DEFENDANT CANNOT
BE CONVICTED ON THE SOLE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE. BY THIS IS MEANT THAT IF THE
ONLY PROOF OF ANY ONE FACT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME IS
FURNISHED BY AN ACCOMPLICE, THEN YOU MUST FIND THE
DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. 11
2o

,. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON ITS OWN VOLITION v!HETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTING WITNESS COULD HAVE BEEN AN ACCOMPLICE UNDER THE
FACTS AND CIRCill1STANCES 0~ THE CASE.
1

4. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE
HEARSAY STATEMlilTTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARISING FROM CONVERSATIONS NOT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT.

POINT NO. I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FURNISHING THE JURY WITH
FOMRS OF VERDICT IN THE MATTER, FAILING AND NEGLECT-

ING TO FURNISH VERDICTS FOR ANY AND ALL INCLUDED OFFENCES, PARTICULARLY A VERDICT OF PROPER FOID~ TO ENABLE THE JURY TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ATTEMPT
TO COMMIT SODOMY.

The court erred in not furnishing the jury with
sufficient and proper forms of verdicts to cover all
and any included offences, comprehending all the facts
and evidence testified to, and involved in the case,
and particularly a verdict in proper form to enable the
jury to find, if in their judgment the facts justified
the same, that the defendant was guilty of an attempt
to commit

sodo~

only.

In the case Cupp vs. State

(74 SW2nd 801), the Court said:
We believe the better practice would be, if the
court is going to give to the jury a form of verdict, it should give a form of every kind of verdict that may possibly be returned by the jury.
Otherwise, it may be construed by the jury to
mean that the court is of the opinion that only
a certain kind of verdict was justified under the
law and the facts.
and then

~rent

on to comment:

in Law
the
jury
assessed
a
However,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library.instant
Funding for digitization case
provided by thethe
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and Library
Services
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the penitentiary,

which is the ~aximum penalty for murder without
malice, when the minimum penalty with malice is
two years. Therefore, if the charge was error it
was harmless error. Harmless error is no grounds
for reversal.
In the case of Riley vs. State, a Texas case, 19?4,

(75 SW 2nd 880) on a rehearsing the court found the
following:
That said paragraph 22 of th·e case ignored the
right of the appellant to hav~ the jury told

what form of verdict they should render if they
found the appellant guilty of assault to murder
without malice is beyold question, as is also
·the materiality of the same as likely to inflict
injury upon the appellant from the standpoint of
the possible infliction of the lighter pen~
alty if proper forms of verdict had been submitted, and also the possible recommen~ation of a
suspended sentence in such case. The attention
of the court below was pointedly called to the error by a specific exception. We think we erred
in not directing a reversal of the ease for such
error.
The case was reversed and remanded.
In the case of Peopee· vs. Pratt ( 228 Pac. 47), a

California case, 1924, wherein the form of the verdiet, which was given by the court to the jury, would
have been sufficient prior to the amendment of the
act \vhich took place after the arrest of the def.endby the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
ant. butSponsored
before
trial.
theAct,court
held
that the form
Library
Services and Technology
administered by the
Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the verdict being sufficient prior to the amendment,
that this offence would not come under the amendment,
and therefore denied reversal of the trial court 1 $
decision.

However, in its obiter dictum, the court

states:
When forms of verdict are submitted to the jury
they should be comprehensive enough to cover
every phase of the law under the evidence, and
should include any kind of verdict that the jury
would be warranted in returning after its deliberation, and this is especially so where a statute requires that a yerdict of guilty shall assess the degree of the crime, and the place of
imprisonment. If, therefore, the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of the amendment it is
clearly apparent that his substantial rights have
been affected.
In West vs. State (208 Pac. 412), an Arizona case,
July 20, 1922, the court held that it is claimed that
because section 1084 of the penal code provides that
When the defendant is acquitted upon the grounds
that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the act charged, the verdict must be.not
guilty by reason of insanity. A form of verdict
ineorporating that idea should also have been
submitted to the jury, and a failure to do so
was error; also, that it was error to tell the
jury that if they found the defendant insane at
the time the act was committed, they should return a verdict of not guilty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court to submit forms of verdicts to the jury,
it may be conceded that when he does so he
should submit as many forms as the facts of the
case would permit to be returned. But before
a failure to do so could be made the basis of
a reversible error, it must be made to appear
that the om.ission:prejudiced in some way the
rights of the defendant.
The court held in that matter that the verdict given by the judge, and acted upon by the jur,y, was
more.favorable to the defendant, and-therefore his
rights were not prejudiced.
It is the contention of the defendant that when
the court furnished

th~

forms of verdict, as set forth

above, enumerated and designated as Nos. 1, 2 and 3,
the forms of verdict so furnished did not comprehend
or embrace all of the offences which might have been
deliberated upon by the jury, and that the form of
verdict designated as Number 2 set forth no kfund of
offence which the jur.y might have found the defendant guilty of, to-wit
We, the jury impaneled in the above entitled
cause, find the defendant guilty of the crime of
intent to commit sodomy charged in the informa-
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tion.
The intent to commit sodomy is, of course, an essential element to the crime of

sodo~

itself, and· the

intent to commit sodomy is not a crime under the statute or at common law.

In all probability what the

court below had in mind in presenting such forms to
the jury was that the jur.y might have found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit sodomy, which form
of werdict was never given to the

and therefore

j~,

they-had no opportunity to consider such included offense although the court had instructed them on such
an offense (R-22, Instructions 4 and 5).

It is fur-

ther contended by the defendant that the failure to
furnish a proper form on an attempt to commit sodomy,
which the court had instructed upon, amounts to such
I

error as warrants a reversal of the judgment and sentence of the court below, that fromfue forms of verdiet furnished to the jur.y the opportunity to consider
under those forms the question of guilt or innocence
of the defendant of the lesser crime of an attempt to
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
Institute of Museum
Library Services
commit Sponsored
sodomy,
was
denied
by provided
the by thejur,y
by andthe
failure of
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the court to furnish such proper form.

Moreover,

the jury may have construed the forms furnished as
giving them no other choice than to consider and deliberate on the guilt of the defendant of the crime of
sodomy as charged in the information, or to consider
an acquittal of that charge, since no instruction was
given them consistent with the second form furnished.
Who can say that the jur,y would not have considered the included offense if a proper form of verdict
had been furnished them?

That under the forms furn-

ished, the· court had been persuaded by the evidence
that no such form was necessary, and therefore the
·jury might find the defendant guilty of committing

the creme of sodomy as charged in the information, or
might not find him guilty of such offense?

The de-

fendant contends that he was entitled to have the
included offense of attempt to commit sodomy considered, and that such consideration might have been suggested by a proper form of verdict, had it been given.
The defendant contends that it was the duty of the court
in
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furnishin~

one or more forms of verdict for the

jury's consideration, to furnish proper forms for all
offenses which might be comprehended and included in

the charge against the defendant as set forth in the
information; that under the law and facts of the case
at bar, that the trial court in failing to furnish
the jur.y with the proper form of verdict covering and
embracing the lesser offense of an attempt to commit
sodomy was a derrogation of, and prejudicial to the
substantive rights of the defendant, and particularly
in view of Instructions 4 and 5 given the

ju~

as

cited above.
POINT NO. II
THE COURT ERRED lli REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDAl'JT • S REQU~STED INSTRUCTIONS: 11YOU ARE FURTHER IN!
STRUCTED THAT IF Tlffi WITNESS, :MAVIS NORTH, CONSENTED
TO THE ALLEGED ACT OF SODOMY, SHE ~-JOULD THEN BE AN

ACCOIVJPLICE, AND UNLESS HER TESTIMONY AS TO AJ-::JY ESSENTIAL FACT \tJERE CORROBORATED, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. "
•ryou ABE INSTRUCTED THAT THE DEFENDANT CAN!WID
BE CONVICTED ON THE SOLE AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE. BY THIS IS l"lEANT 1 HAT IF rrHE
ONLY PROOF OF ANY ONE FACT ESSENTIAL TO THE CRIME IS
FURNISHED BY AN ACCOMPLICE, THEN YOU IVJUST FIND THE
DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY. 11
1

The defendant contends that under the facts and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
Institute of Museum
Library Servicesthe
the testimony
asLawrendered
inprovided
theby thecase
atandbar,
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

question of whether or not,,under such facts and testimony, Jflavis North, the complaining witness herein, was
or was not an accomplice, was a question of fact which
~hould

have been submitted to the

j~ry

under proper in-

structions, and that the court's refusal to give the
requested instructions of the defendant, or instructions on its own volition, amounted to a prejudicial
error.
In the case of People vs. Featherstone (67 Cal.

App. 2nd 793; 155 Pac. 2nd, 685) the court said:
When the question of an accomplice arises in the
trial of a case, the general and accepted rule
is:r'for the court to instruct the jury touching
the law of accomplices, a.nd leave the question of
whether or not the witness be an accomplice for
the decision of the jur,y as a matter of fact.
Cited in that case with approval is the ca.se of People vs. Coffey (161 California 44), 119 Pac. 901) in
which case the court held:
Whether or not a witness is an accomplice of the
accused is for the determinatimn of the jUlJT on
conflicting evidence, but for the court where
his acts and conduct are admitted.
In the case at· bar the evidence and

testimo~

as
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acts of the commission of the crime, and denied by the
defendant, puts such testimony before the jury in a
conflicting state, and under such circumstances it was
the duty of the court to put to the jury the question
as to whether or not the complaining witness was an
accomplice.
In the case of Dickens vs. People (186 Pac. 277;

67 Colorado 409) the court held:
That the error of the court in refusing to give
proper instructions will be presumed to be prejudicial in the absence of affirmative showing to
the contrary.
In the case of State vs. Carey ( 122 P·ac. 868) . the
court states:
That if the ju~ from a consideration of the character of the complaining witness was of the opinion that he might readily be a party to such
crime, they might, under certain circumstru1ces,
be justified in reaching the conclusion that he
was the guilty party alone, or an accomplice.
If the ju~ was satisfied from the evidence that
the complaining witness was an accomplice, if
the offense was attempted, then and unless there
was corroborating evidence, it would be the duty
of the ju~ to acquit, for by the statute conviction cannot be had upon the uncorroborated
evidence of an accomplice.
Whebher he consented is a question for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ju~

in all cases where the evidence is at all doubtful.
The jur,y should have considered the question of
whether or not the prosecutrix was an accomplice, as
gathered from her character, her conduct and demeanor,
both before and after the alleged commission of the
crime, as testified to by the complaining witness
(Tr-9, lines 15 to:"26), that she met the defendant at
a beer tavern in Park City; that complaining witness
and the defendant, after some conversation at The
Drift, a beer tavern in Park City,_ Utah, left for
Heber City, Utah (Tr-13); that before leaving, she,
the complaining witness bought and paid for a bottle
of wine for them to drink on the way to Heber City;
(Tr-12, lines 6, 7, and 8);
witness had

that the complaining

been charged with adultery and admit-

ted the charge (Tr-35, lines 13 to 25);

that the

complaining witness did not cry for help during or
immediately after the commission of the alleged offense while people in a car were present in the
near vicinity;

all of -r,.rhich testimony should have
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court as to whether or not the demeanor on the part
of the complaining witness was not only salient to a
consideration of her creditability, but should have
been considered in connection with whether or not she

was an accomplice in the act.
The failure of the trial court at the request of
the defendant to instruct the jury on the law of
accomplices was held to be reversible error by
the appellate court in Hewett vs. State, 1927, an
Oklahoma case (38 Okla. Cr.m. 105; 259 Pac. 144),
where the defendant was convicted of forgery in
making a false entr.y in the records of the bank
on the testimony of a fellow employee, who could
have been found to have actually made the entry,
under the direction of the defendant, and who
acknowledged that it was false.
In Wingo vs. State, a Texas case, 1919 (210

sW

547)

The appellate court reversed the conviction on
the ground that the charge of the trial court
unduly restricted the jur.y's right to find that
the witness was an accomplice. The trial court 1 s
charge predicated the jury's right to find that
she was an accomplice upon their belief that she
did voluntarily and with the same intent which
actuated the defendant, unite with him in the
alleged commission of the offense. The appellate
court held that in determining whether or not she
wa.s an accomplice where she had stated that she
submitted through force and fear, the jury should
consider all of the facts in the case in determining whether or not her testimony was an accomplice's
testimony, and that if proof showed that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

she consented, or did not_oppose the act, she
was an accomplice witness.
Under Paragraph 20 in 920 ALR, page 86, under the
necessity for instruction to the jury, it has
been held that where there is conflicting evidence as to whether the witness is an accomplice,
the trial court must instruct the jur,y upon the
subject of accomplices regardless of whether or
not such instruction has been requested by the
defendant.
Underhill on Criminal Evidence, under the topic
of Crimes against Person, Paragraph 360, page 623,
Second Edition, states:
And as the crime is usually committed when no
third party is present, corroboration is very
difficult if not impossible to obtain, except
so far as it may be found in circumstances which
woulcrk!naturally accompany the commission of such
offense. vfuen, however, the crime is attempted
without or against the consent of the pathic party he is not an accomplice, and a conviction may
be had upon his testimony alone. Whether he consented is a question for the jury in all cases
where the evidence is at all doubtful. Evidence
to show that he did or did not consent is always
relevant, particularly in the case of a charge of
assault with intent to commit sodomy.
In Cole vs. State (17.5 Pac. 2nd, 376), a.n Oklahoma case, 1946, the court said:
Although the presecuting witness denied that he
consented to the act, there were strong circumstances to refute this statement, which would indicate
he
consented
toby thewhat
wasand Library
done.
His
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testimony after the first act was committed was
that he immediately ·went off to saeep in the same
bed with the defendant, and did not awaken until
the defendant disturbed him about sunrise while
attempting to commit a second act. That the witness did not yell for help, or attempt to leave
the premises, buttook a bath and listened to the
radio while the defendant was shaving, preparatory to going to church, that he went to church
with the defendant and remained in his company
during the day are strong ciraumstances to indicate that if the act was committed it was with
the consent of Roy Longhopper. If it was done
with his consent then he was an accomplice, and
his testiomny would have to be corroborated by
independent evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime before
the jury would have been jusitified in finding
the defendant guilty.
In this case the complaining witness didn't tell
what happened for two months.

In the case a bar the

prosecutrix let two days elapse before she complained
to the Sheriff of the alleged acts of the defendant.
Moreoever, in the case at bar she did not

c~

for help

and remained in the defendant's company and purchased
beer for him, and visited a beer tavern with him, and
also her husband at the hospital as above recited.
POINT NO. Ill

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 1'0 INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON ITS OWN VOLITION WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTING
WITNESS CHOULD HAVE BEEN .AN ACCCMPLICE UNDER THE FACrrs
AI~D CIRCUMSTAl~CES OF THE CASE.
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In Medis vs. State (27 Texas Appeals, 194; 11
SW 112), the court held:
That on trial for sodomy the testimony of a person on which the act was committed must be corroborated if he consented and the ju~ should be
so instructed where the consent is in doubt. (See
also Cole vs. State.)
Although the defendant asked for an instruction
to the effect that if the complaining witness consented to the alleged act of sodomy,· she would then be an
accomplice, which/instruction the court refused, but the
instruction requested was sufficient to call the court's
attention to the subject of accomplices and that there
might be facts and circumstances in the case tending
to show the prosecuting witness to be an accomplice,
and that the court on its own motion should have
submitted this question
was dissatisfied

~;,Jith

to-~the

jury, and if the court

the instruction requested by

the defendant, it should have defined for the jury
the essential acts, nature and character of an accomplice.
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In People vs. Warren (104 Pac. 2nd, 1024):
The defendants were convicted of illegal possession of firearms. The only testimony implicating
the named defendant was that of one Groom, who
had been arrested on the same charge with others,
and subsequently released. Groom denied on the
stand that he owned or handled any guns, but he
admitted that he had previously taken the cylinder out of one of them to a hardware store, and
purchased bullets to fit it, and returned it to
one of the defendants. The defendant, Warren,
claimed that the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury as to
what constituted an accomplice, and the necessity
for the corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice, even though he had requested no such
instructions at the trial. This contention was
upheld by the appellate court in reversing the
conviction as to warrant, on its findings, that
there was testimony from which the jury might
have concluded that Groom was an accomplice.
People vs. Peturcci, 1947.

67 NY 2nd, 611; 271

App. Div. 1936.
Because of a ruling of the trial court, that as
a matter of law, the complaining witness was not
an accomplice of the defendant, the appellate
court held that whether there was a voluntary submission to the act on his part was a question
for the jury.
In F'eople vs. Peck ( 18.5 Pac. 881) the court
stated:
It is the duty of'the court in criminal cases to
give of its own motion, where they are not proposed
presented
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selves, instructions on the general principles of
law pertinent to the case; but it is not his duty
to give instructions on specific points developed
through the evidence introduced in the trial, such
as the legal scope of impeaching testimony, unless
such instructions are requested by the party desiring them.
The above case was also upheld by the California Appellate Court.

In Hendrickson vs. Commonwealth (235

Kentuc~

5,

29 SW 2nd 646) the court said:
Because of the failure of the trial court to
instruct the jur,y as to the weight to be given the
testimony of the co.-defendants in each case, that
the jury could not properly pass on the questions
of whether the witness was an accomplice or not
without proper instructions from the court, and
that it .was _the duty of the court to instruct the
jur.y, and that where the facts authorized it; the
failure to do so universally has been held by us
to be such an error as to require reversal of the
judgment.
In the case at bar no instructions were given the
jury on the subject of accomplices, and therefore the

court and the jury could have assumed the complaining
witness not to be an accomplice, although there were
many facts and circumstances testified to upon which,
under proper instructions, the

ju~

could have consid-
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witness was in fact an accomplice.

Under the instruc-

tions given by the court to the jury it is assumed that
the complaining witness was as a matter of law not an
accomplice, and the jur,y 1 s right to consider the question of whether or not the facts justified a finding that
she was an accomplice was denied consideration and
deliberation.

It is important and pertinent that the

failure of the prosecuting witness to relate the
alleged acts of the defendant to the officers for a
period of two days after they were alleged to have
happened casts some doubt upon the veracity of the
testimony of the complaining witness, sufficient at
least to have the question of whether or not she was
an accomplice submitted to the jur,y as a question of
fact, especially so where such acts and testimony as
to the place and commission of the crime have been
denied by the defendant himself.
In People vs. Coffey (161 Cal. 443; 19 Pac. 901)
the .court held:
Whether a witness is an accomplice of the accused
is for the determination of the jur,y on conflictSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing evidence, but for the court where his acts
and conduct are admitted.
POll\1T NO. IV
THE COURT ERRED JN

ALLO\~ING

IN EVIDENCE HEARSAY

STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS ARISING

FRa~

CONVERSATIONS

NOT IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT .•

The particular hearsay evidence which the court
allowed was testified to by the Sheriff in a conversation with the defendant, Frank David Clauson, and
over the objection of the defendant, the court allowed
the following testimony to be given (Tr-82, line 15):

A.

I think I asked him, or Mr. Gale asked him,
whehter or not he was not on shift that night.
He said, "Yes o " He said he worked at the mine
and he had brought her over before and worked
too. I said, 11Are you sure you worked at the
mine? 11 He said, "Yes, I worked at the mine."
I said, 11Did you bring her directly to Heber?"
And he said, 11Yes, I did. u I said, •ryou didn't
stop anyplace 1 u He said, "No, I didn 1 t. " I
said, ur believe I better tell you what she said."
He said, trWha.t did she say? 11 I said, "She claims
on the way over from Fark City, that you drove up
the Kamas road and took her up someplace and"--

Mr. Hatch:

I object to this testimony as being
hearsay. I appreciate it is said for the purpose
of clearing up what he said to Mr. Clauson, but
ti is now giving what Mrs. North may have said to
him, and, because of that, I object to that testimony.
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The Court: He may state what ¥rr. Clauson said
and also the conversation as to what he said,
relative to this.

Mr. Hatch:

But not for the purpose of getting the
hearsay between his conversations, between he and
Mrs. North.

Mr. Howard: He is relating what he said, not outside the presence of the Defendant.
The Court:
answer.

The objection is overruled.

He may

A (Continued) "and took her up someplace on the
mountain where he had illicit sexual relations."
He said, ttthat is not 1rue. I drove her straight
to Heber." I said, "She makes it even worse than
that. She said you used a wire around her throat
and also that you stuck her with a knife in an attempt to make her give in to you. 11 He Said, "That
is not the truth", that he didn 1 t take her off the
road against her will or at a.ny time. I said,
"You certainly don't have to tell me anything that
you don't want to, I am just telling you what
Mrs. North said. n So we continued on' to Heber
City and that is about all the conversation that
I recall until we got to the courthouse. Then,
as we came in the office, Mr. Gale and I sat down.
At that time, Mr. Clauson remembered that perhaps
he had laid off a day that week. He said he
didn't make it back on shift, that he had lais off
a day and he thought it was the 13th.
The conversation between the complaining witness,
Mavis North, and the Sheriff was made outside the presence of the defendant, and therefore. constitutes
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overruling the objection to its admission, prejudiced
the rights of the defendant to a fair and impartial
trial.

In

the case of People vs. Huston,

(1?4

Pac. 2nd

758; 21 Cal. 2nd 690) the court said:
The fact that the prosecutrix made a complaint in
the prosecution for committing a lewd act is admissible as "original evidence,n but testimony
concerning the details as then given, or the name
6£tthe defendant accused is hearsay.
In Coppage vs~ State

(1?7

Pac. 2nd

797), ap Okla-

homa case, the court on appeal said:
In rape prosecution testimony of prosecutrix 1 s
employer as to conversation with prosecutrix
after she had been brought back to City by alleged assailant, during which interval prosecutrix
had opportunity to deliberate upon a statement was
not part of 11 res gestae" and hence was inadmissible as hearsay.
Generally testimony cannot be corroborated by
proof that the witness stated same facts testified to in court on some occasion when not under
oath and not in the presence of the accused, but
such statements are excluded as hearsay.
In People vs. Bro~~

(16' Pac. 2nd 699) a Califor-

nia case, the court said:
In eex cases generally, evidence of recital of
facts by victim to third party is inadmissible
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McPhee vs. People; Supreme Court of Colorado,
January 29, 1940 (98 Pac. 2nd 997).

On page 998 of

the report the court said:
Chief Boyer (police chief) and Sohoepflin (a coconspirator) were permitted to testify to a conversation occu·rring between them, when the defendant was not present, as to the manner in which
McPhee (defendant) wanted to dispose of stolen
cars. This evidence was clearly hearsay • • • •
The statements made by Sehoepflin to Boyer with
reference to McPhee's participation in the conspiracy to dispose of stolen automobiles, while
admissible against Schoepflin under the circumstances, if he had been on trial, were not admissible against McPhee.
The court fUrther said in the past paragraph on page

998 of the report:
Under these circumstances the admission of the
hearsay testimony, particularly that of Boyer
(police chief) constituted prejudicial error.
(The designation of parties in parentheses are ours.)
People vs. Jaramillo (30 Pac. 2nd 427; Cal. Appo

2?2), 19?4,

said:

Police woman 1 s statement that an interpreter said
to· her that defendant, who spoke Spanish, admitted sexual relations with prosecutrix held inadmissible as hearsay.
People vs. Mangum (32 Cal. App. 2nd; 88 Pac. 2nd,

207)!
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In prosecution for rape by force, objections to
questions propounded to witness and calling for a
conversation between witness and prosecutrix were
properly sustained, since questions call for hearsay testimony.

In Clark vs. People (86 Pac. 2nd 257) (10) Colorado )71), the Colorado Supreme Court held:

In prosecution for murder by abortion, permitting
man by whom the deceased was pregnant to testify
that the deceased had told him she was going to
have an abortion performed by the defendant was
reversible error, where conversation took place
out of the defendant's presence and prior to the
time the· deceased met the defendant.
State vs. Chealey (116 Pac. 2nd,

?77), a Utah

case:

In involuntary manslaughter prosecution based on
death resulting when truck driven by accused overturned, testimony as to conversations between two
persons at the time when the accused was not present should have been excluded as hearsay, but if
admissible, such testimony was admissible only for
impeachment purposes.

In State vs. Cheameres (147 Pac. 2nd, 815; modified
in 150 Pac. 2nd, 1012), a Washington case, the court
said:
In prosecution for living with a common prostitute,
testimony of investigator for office of prosecuting attorney, that woman with whom the defendant
was charged with living told him that she was a·
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present when the admission was made.
In the case of Miller vs. People, Supreme Court
of Colorado, February 24, 1936

(55

Pac. 2nd )20), under

Notes 3 - 5 on Page 321 of the report the court says:
The law seems to be that, while statements, confessions, and admissions of guilt made by one of
several persons jointly indicted and tried for the
same offense are admissible against the person
making them, they are not admissible against his
co-defendants unless made in their presence and
assented to by them.
In the same case the court further states:
Sheriff 1 s testimony as to private conversations
with the principal in the commission of a crime
implicating a co-defendant as accessory before
the fact, held inadmissible as hearsay in a separate trial of such co-defendant.
In the case at bar,

alt~ough

Sheriff Payne testified

to a conversation he had with the defendant, the objectionable part of that conversation being that he
was allowed to repeat on the witness stand, and before
the jury, statements and conclusions which the complaining witness had told him, while not under oath
and out of the presence of the defendant, and after
the occurrence of an interval of two days from the
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crime

upon the person of

•
the complaining witness, and after she had purchased

a bottle of whiskey.

Clearly such testimony is hear-

say under the authorities, and a reptition of such
statements made by the· complaining witness to the Sheriff, and repeated by him on the witness stand tended
to lend dignity and enhancement to them and could
have easily influenced the jury as to their truth when
spoken by such a creditable witness.
Viewing the record as a whole, the defendant contends that he has not had a fair and impartial trial,
and that the errors of the trial court, as pointed
out in this brief, are of such serious moment as to arrest the attention of the court, and warrant reversing
the judgment of the court below.
Respectfully submitted,
Glen

s.

Hatch
A. M. Marsden
Attorneys for
Appellant
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